Bowers v. Hardwick: A Giant Step Back for Privacy Rights by Maurer, Randi
Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School
Digital Commons at Loyola Marymount
University and Loyola Law School
Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review Law Reviews
4-1-1987
Bowers v. Hardwick: A Giant Step Back for Privacy
Rights
Randi Maurer
This Notes and Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ Loyola Marymount University and
Loyola Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons@Loyola Marymount University and Loyola Law School. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@lmu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Randi Maurer, Bowers v. Hardwick: A Giant Step Back for Privacy Rights, 20 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 1013 (1987).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/llr/vol20/iss3/11
BOWERS v. HARDWICK: A GIANT STEP BACK
FOR PRIVACY RIGHTS
I. INTRODUCTION
"Socrates and Plato made no bones about their homosexu-
ality .... Virgil and Horace wrote erotic poems about men;
Michaelangelo's great love sonnets were addressed to young
men, and so were Shakespeare's. There seems to be evidence
that Alexander the Great was homosexual and Julius Caesar
certainly was .... So were Charles XII of Sweden and Freder-
ick the Great. Several English monarchs have been homosex-
ual .... About others- Marlowe, Tchaikovsky, Whitman,
Kitchener, Rimbaud, Verlaine, Proust, Gide, Wilde, and many
more-there is no reasonable doubt [about their homo-
sexuality]."'
Homosexuality has been part of society for centuries. However, it is
only recently, in Bowers v. Hardwick,2 that the United States Supreme
Court addressed the issue of whether a state statute which criminalizes
sodomy3 violated the Constitution of the United States. The Court held
that such a statute, as applied to homosexual sodomy, did not violate the
Constitution.4
This Note will analyze the majority's reasoning and discuss how the
majority incorrectly interpreted precedent to reach its holding in this
case. This Note will also analyze the dissenting opinions and explain
how the dissent correctly interpreted precedent to reach the opposite
conclusion. Further, the author will supply an alternative rationale and
explain why the Georgia sodomy statute, as applied, violates the equal
protection clause of the United States Constitution,5 an argument not
addressed by either the majority or the dissent.
1. G. GEIS, NOT THE LAW'S BUSINESS 24 (1979) (quoting B. MAGEE, ONE IN TWENTY:
A STUDY OF HOMOSEXUALITY IN MEN AND WOMEN 46 (1966)).
2. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
3. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2(a) (1984). The statute provides: "A person commits the
offense of sodomy when he performs or submits to any sexual act involving the sex organs of
one person and the mouth or anus of another. . . ." Id.
4. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2843-44.
5. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The equal protection clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment provides that "[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." Id.
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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. The Facts
In August 1982, Michael Hardwick, an adult male homosexual, was
arrested when the police found him committing the act of sodomy with
another adult male in the privacy of his own bedroom.6 The arrest was
based on a violation of section 16-6-2 of the Georgia Code which
criminalizes such behavior.' The district attorney decided not to present
the matter to the grand jury unless further evidence developed.' Hard-
wick, fearing imminent danger of future arrest due to his continued ho-
mosexual activity, filed suit in federal district court for declaratory
judgment. He alleged that the Georgia statute was unconstitutional as
applied to consensual sodomy. 9
John and Mary Doe, a married couple, joined Hardwick as plain-
tiffs; they too feared arrest since the statute as worded applied to heter-
osexuals as well as homosexuals."0 The district court held that the Does
did not have standing because they had not sustained direct injury, nor
were they in immediate danger of sustaining injury."
Relying on Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney," the district court
granted defendant's motion to dismiss Hardwick's action for failure to
state a claim. 3 Hardwick then appealed the decision to the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals. 4
Since Doe had been undermined by later decisions, the Eleventh Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals reversed the lower court, holding that the sum-
mary affirmance in Doe did not require that Hardwick's suit be dismissed
for failure to state a claim. 5 The court held that the Georgia statute
6. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2842 (1986). The case did not discuss why the
police were in Hardwick's apartment. However, an article discussing Bowers revealed that the
Georgia police went to Hardwick's home to serve a warrant for his arrest regarding a minor
liquor offense. The police officer was invited in by a house guest, whereupon the officer discov-
ered Hardwick having sexual relations in his bedroom with another man. Robinson, Sodomy
and the Supreme Court, COMMENTARY, Oct. 1986, at 57, 58.
7. See supra note 3.
8. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2842.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 2842 n.2.
11. Id.
12. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (district court dismissed
male homosexual's challenge of Virginia sodomy law; affirmed by the Supreme Court by sum-
mary judgment).
13. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2842.
14. Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (1lth Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
15. Id. at 1210. The court was referring to Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Stan-
ley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See
infra text accompanying notes 104-13 and 152-55 for a discussion of Eisenstadt; infra text
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violated Hardwick's fundamental right of privacy under the ninth
amendment16 and the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment,
17
since homosexuality is a private intimate association beyond the reach of
state regulation.' 8
The case was then remanded for trial.' 9 Michael Bowers, the Attor-
ney General of Georgia, petitioned for certiorari, which was granted by
the United States Supreme Court.20 The Court reversed the Eleventh
Circuit opinion, and held the Georgia statute unconstitutional.2 '
B. The Court's Reasoning
1. The majority opinions
a. Justice White
Justice White, writing for the majority, stated that the issue in this
case was whether the Constitution conferred upon homosexuals a funda-
mental right to engage in sodomy. 22 He determined that since the right
to engage in sodomy was not fundamental,23 the right of privacy under
the Constitution24 did not extend to consensual homosexual sodomy.25
He cited several cases to illustrate that the right of privacy had been
extended to areas such as education and child rearing,26 family relation-
ships,27 procreation,28 marriage,29 contraception 30 and abortion.3' Jus-
accompanying notes 215-52 for a discussion of Stanley; and infra text accompanying notes
145-53 for a discussion of Griswold.
16. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1212. The ninth amendment provides that "[t]he enumeration
of the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others re-
tained by the people." U.S. CONST. amend. IX. See infra note 152 for a discussion of how the
ninth amendment is related to the right of privacy.
17. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1212. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment
provides that "[n]o State shall... deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.. . ." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1. See infra note 152.
18. Hardwick, 760 F.2d at 1212.
19. Id. at 1213.
20. 106 S. Ct. 342 (1985).
21. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2843.
22. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986). See infra text accompanying notes 180-
81 and 237-38 for an analysis of how the Court framed the issue.
23. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
24. See infra text accompanying notes 145-67 for a discussion of the history of the right to
privacy.
25. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2843-44.
26. Id. at 2843 (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (Oregon law requir-
ing all "normal" children from eight to sixteen years of age to attend public school violates due
process, unless it has a reasonable relationship to some purpose within the competency of the
state); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (state law proscribing a teacher from teaching
in a language other than English violates due process)).
27. Id. (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (statute providing that no
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tice White stated that none of these areas resembled homosexual
sodomy.32 He asserted that behavior implicates the protection of the
Constitution only where it is a fundamental liberty which is " 'implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty,' such that 'neither liberty, nor justice
would exist if [they] were sacrificed,' -33 or a liberty which is "'deeply
rooted in this Nation's history and tradition.' "3
Justice White found it "obvious" 35 that since the right of adult
homosexuals to engage in consensual sexual relations in the privacy of
their own home did not fit within either of the above definitions, it was
not a fundamental right. He therefore concluded that the right of pri-
vacy could not be extended to protect such behavior.36
Justice White also relied on history to justify the majority's holding.
He stated that since most states had statutes forbidding sodomy at the
time the fourteenth amendment was ratified, and since "proscriptions
against that conduct have ancient roots, ' 37 it is "at best, facetious" to
claim that the right of privacy should extend to consensual sodomy.
38
Justice White rationalized the holding by explaining that it is not the
Court's job to "discover" new fundamental rights, since this would result
minor shall sell newspapers, magazines, or other periodicals upon the streets is constitutional;
state can regulate behavior of children more strictly than adults)).
28. Id. (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (statute requiring sterilization of
habitual criminals violates equal protection)).
29. Id. (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (statute proscribing marriage based on
racial classifications violates due process)). See infra text accompanying notes 93-98 for a
discussion of Loving.
30. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2843-44 (citing Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678
(1977) (statute prohibiting the sale of contraceptives to those under sixteen years of age vio-
lates constitutional right of privacy); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (statute making
it a felony to furnish unmarried persons with contraception is unconstitutional); and Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (statute outlawing use of contraceptives violates due pro-
cess based on right of privacy)).
31. Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (a woman's right to choose to have an
abortion early in pregnancy is protected by the right of privacy under the due process clause of
the fourteenth amendment)). See infra text accompanying notes 89-92 and 160-67 for a discus-
sion of Roe.
32. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
33. Id. (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325-26 (1937)).
34. Id. (quoting Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)).
35. Id. (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 2846.
37. Id. at 2844. The states which had sodomy statutes in effect in 1868 were: Alabama,
Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii,
Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minne-
sota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New
York, North Carolina, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Texas, Vermont, Virginia, West Virginia and Wisconsin. Id. at 2845 n.6.
38. Id. at 2845-46 (emphasis added).
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in "judge-made constitutional law having little or no cognizable roots in
the language.., of the Constitution."39 Therefore, he emphasized how
important it is for the Court to resist expanding the fourteenth amend-
ment's substantive reach. In his opinion, extending the right of privacy
to include consensual homosexual sodomy would overstep the Court's
authority, since there was no constitutional authority to do so.'
When confronted with the argument that the right of privacy should
extend in this case because the activity occurred in the privacy of Hard-
wick's home, Justice White distinguished Hardwick's case from Stanley
v. Georgia.4 In Stanley, the Court held it unconstitutional to criminalize
an invidivual's possession of obscene material in the privacy of the
home.42 Justice White stated that the Stanley decision was firmly
grounded in the first amendment, finding it unpersuasive with respect to
the right of privacy.43 Justice White also felt that consensual homosex-
ual sodomy should not be protected under the right of privacy because it
would be difficult to draw the line between this behavior and behavior
such as adultery, incest or other sexual crimes.4
Finally, Justice White justified the majority's holding by stating that
sentiments held by the majority of the population regarding the morality
of homosexual sodomy provided a sufficient rationale to support Geor-
gia's statute.45 He stated, "[Hardwick] insists that the majority senti-
ments about morality of homosexuality should be declared inadequate.
We do not agree, and are unpersuaded that the sodomy laws of some 25
States should be invalidated on this basis."46 He concluded that the
Georgia sodomy statute, as applied to homosexuality, did not violate the
Constitution.
b. Chief Justice Burger
Chief Justice Burger, in his concurring opinion, supported the hold-
ing of the Court by relying on the history of religious views against ho-
mosexual sodomy.47 He stated, "[c]ondemnation of [homosexual
39. Id. at 2846.
40. Id.
41. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
42. Id. at 568. The case is significant because it distinguishes between regulating the pos-
session of obscene material in the privacy of one's home and regulating obscenity in public.
See infra text accompanying notes 215-50 & 234-37.
43. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2846 (footnote omitted).
47. Id. at 2847 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
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conduct] is firmly rooted in Judaeo-Christian moral and ethical stan-
dards."48 He also stressed his agreement with Justice White that there is
no such thing as a fundamental right to commit homosexual sodomy.
49
c. Justice Powell
In his concurring opinion, Justice Powell also agreed that there is no
fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy.50 However, he
went on to state that Hardwick may be protected under the eighth
amendment of the Constitution.51 He noted that the Georgia statute au-
thorized punishment for up to twenty years in prison for a single act of
sodomy. Since this punishment was also authorized for serious felonies
such as aggravated battery, first degree arson and robbery, Justice Powell
reasoned that a prison sentence for sodomy "would create a serious
eighth amendment issue. '"" He concluded that the eighth amendment
issue was not before the Court because Hardwick had not been convicted




Justice Blackmun concluded that the Georgia sodomy statute vio-
lated the Constitution.54 He began his analysis by criticizing the major-
ity's characterization of the issue, stating that "[t]his case is no more
about 'a fundamental right to engage in homosexual sodomy'.., than
Stanley v. Georgia... was about a fundamental right to watch obscene
movies .... 55 He further criticized the majority holding by concluding
that a long history of a statute's existence,56 the fact that certain religious
groups condemn sodomy, 57 or a belief held by a majority of citizens that
homosexual sodomy is immoral 8 did not provide an adequate justifica-
tion for the Georgia sodomy statute.
48. Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring).
49. Id. (Burger, C.J., concurring).
50. Id. (Powell, J., concurring).
51. Id. (Powell, J., concurring). The eighth amendment provides that "[e]xcessive bail
shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment in-
flicted." U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIII.
52. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2847 (Powell, I., concurring).
53. Id. at 2848 (Powell, 3., concurring).
54. Id. at 2856 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
55. Id. at 2848 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841,
2844 (1986) (majority opinion)).
56. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
57. Id. at 2854-55 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 2855 (Blackmun, 3., dissenting).
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Justice Blackmun stated that the majority should have considered
the eighth amendment, the ninth amendment and the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. 59 He observed that since this case
was before the Court on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim,
the Court had a duty to determine if the allegations provided for relief on
any possible theory." Justice Blackmun chose not to address the eighth
amendment or the equal protection clause because he believed Hardwick
had stated a cognizable claim that the sodomy statute "interefere[d] with
constitutionally protected interests in privacy and freedom of intimate
association."6
Justice Blackmun also criticized the majority for focusing on homo-
sexual sodomy" since, as the statute was worded, the gender of those
who engaged in sodomy was irrelevant as a matter of state law.63
Justice Blackmun concluded that the right of privacy regarding an
individual's right to make certain decisions does extend to consensual
sodomy. He argued that despite the fact that this behavior did not re-
semble childbearing or marriage,' an analysis of the policies underlying
the right of privacy support this conclusion. He stated, "[w]e protect
those rights not because they contribute, in some direct and material way
to the general public welfare, but because they form so central a part of
an individual's life... the 'moral fact that a person belongs to himself and
not others nor to society as a whole.' "65 He stressed the fact that sexual
intimacy is a key relationship of human existence which contributes to
community welfare, and thus is integral to one's right of privacy.66
Justice Blackmun also stated that the right of privacy implicit in the
fourth amendment regarding special protection of the home should also
59. Id. at 2849 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See supra note 51 for the language of the eighth
amendment, supra note 16 for the language of the ninth amendment, and supra note 5 for the
language of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.
60. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2849 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 2849-50 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 2849 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
63. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See supra note 3. Justice Blackmun stated that a claim
under the equal protection clause could well be available since Georgia exclusively stressed its
interest in prosecuting only homosexual sodomy despite the fact that the statute itself is gen-
der-neutral. For Justice Blackmun, this raised a serious question of discriminatory enforce-
ment. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2850 n.2. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See infra text accompanying
notes 253-347 for an equal protection analysis.
64. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2851 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
65. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct. 2169, 2187 n.5 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(1986)).
66. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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extend to consensual sodomy.67 He believed that the majority incor-
rectly interpreted Stanley v. Georgia by not recognizing its significance
with respect to the protection of private behavior within the home.6" He
noted that, "the right of an individual to conduct intimate relationships
in the intimacy of his or her own home seems to me to be the heart of the
Constitution's protection of privacy."69 He further criticized the major-
ity for comparing consensual sexual activity with possession of firearms
or stolen goods in the home.7'
In Justice Blackmun's conclusion, he stated that depriving individu-
als of the right to make decisions regarding their intimate relationships
poses a severe threat to values deeply rooted in America's history.7'
I b. Justice Stevens
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens discussed two issues: (1)
whether a state may totally prohibit consensual sodomy with a neutral
law, applying it to heterosexuals-married or single-and to homosexu-
als; and if not, (2) whether the state may save the statute by enforcing it
exclusively against homosexuals.72
Justice Stevens stated that the Georgia statute could not be enforced
as written because it applied to married heterosexuals.73 Relying on
Griswold v. Connecticut74 and Eisenstadt v. Baird,7 he concluded that a
state may not prohibit sodomy within "'the sacred precincts of marital
bedrooms.' ,,76
He then reasoned that Georgia must carry the burden of justifying
selective application because homosexuals have the same liberty interest
under the fourteenth amendment as all other citizens of Georgia.77 Jus-
tice Stevens stated that intrusion into the private conduct of heterosexu-
als or homosexuals equally burdens an individual's liberty interest.7 8 He
stated that unless Georgia could justify selective application of the sod-
67. Id. at 2852 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 2852-53 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557
(1969)). See supra note 41.
69. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2853 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
70. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
71. Id. at 2856 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
72. Id. at 2857 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
73. Id. at 2858 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See infra text accompanying notes 145-53.
75. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). See infra text accompanying notes 104-13 & 154-55.
76. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2858 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut,
381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965)).
77. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
78. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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omy statute, the statute violated the due process clause of the fourteenth
amendment.
79
Justice Stevens concluded that the sodomy statute violated Hard-
wick's liberty interest under the due process clause.8" He reasoned that
the statute cannot stand if selectively applied to homosexuals, since
Georgia had not identified a neutral, legitimate state interest to justify
selective application.81 He criticized the majority's view that Georgia
had justified selective application based on the notion that the Georgia
electorate viewed homosexual sodomy as immoral.82 He pointed out that
contrary to this notion, the Georgia electorate must have believed that all
acts of sodomy were immoral, since the statute itself did not single out
homosexuals.
83
Justice Stevens further concluded that support for a legitimate state
interest was weakened by the fact that the statute had not been enforced
for decades.84 He believed that Hardwick alleged a constitutional claim
sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.8
III. ANALYSIS
The following analysis will examine why the length of time a statute
has existed, morality in the abstract, or a religious purpose is not a suffi-
cient rationale to justify upholding a statute as constitutional. Further,
the analysis will examine why the constitutional right of privacy should
protect consensual adult homosexual sodomy occurring in the privacy of
the home, and why the Georgia sodomy statute, as applied, violates equal
protection.
A. History, Morality and Religion: Insufficient Bases for
Constitutional Analysis
1. History
A long history of a statute's existence is an insufficient rationale for
concluding that the statute is constitutional.86 Therefore, Justice White's
reliance on the long history of sodomy statutes was an inappropriate ba-
79. Id. at 2859 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See supra note 17 for the language of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
80. Id. (Stevens, ., dissenting).
81. Id. at 2858-59 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82. Id. (Stevens, 3., dissenting).
83. Id. at 2859 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
84. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
85. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
86. See infra text accompanying notes 89-100.
April 1987] 1021
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:1013
sis for concluding that Georgia's sodomy statute was constitutional.87
Justice White's reasoning was circular and unconvincing; a statute is not
constitutional merely because it has existed for a long period of time.
Rather, a statute is constitutional because it does not violate a clause of
the Constitution. As Justice Blackmun pointed out in his dissent, "'it is
revolting if. . . the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the
past.' "88 If a long history of a statute's existence could justify upholding
a statute as constitutional, many laws found in the past to be unconstitu-
tional would still exist.
One example of the illogic of Justice White's assertion can be seen in
the Court's treatment of abortion statutes. Like sodomy statutes, stat-
utes proscribing abortion have existed for centuries. At the time the
fourteenth amendment was passed, thirty-six states had statutes
criminalizing abortion.89 However, when, in Roe v. Wade,90 a pregnant
woman brought a class action suit challenging Texas abortion statutes,
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, expressly rejected the notion
that a statute's history can dictate whether it is constitutional. Contrary
to Justice White's view in Bowers, Justice Blackmun stated:
Our task, of course, is to resolve the issue by constitutional
measurement, free of emotion and predilection.
:1 * *
... "[The Constitution] is made for people of fundamentally
differing views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions
87. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38. In Bowers, both Justice White and Chief
Justice Burger referred to the existence of sodomy statutes in the common law of England to
support their view that the long history of sodomy statutes was a sufficient basis for upholding
the Georgia statute. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841, 2844-45 n.5, 2847 (1986). It is true
that even as late as the early 1960's judges in England felt that it was the law's business to
enforce morality. This view was known as "legal moralism." H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY,
AND MORALITY 6 (1963). However, both Justice White and Chief Justice Burger failed to
acknowledge that England ended criminalization of consensual adult homosexual sodomy by
repealing its sodomy statutes in 1966. G. GIs, supra note 1, at 45. England's repeal of its
sodomy laws was based on a report by a committee appointed by the British government. Id.
at 42; see also H.L.A. HART, supra, at 13. The committee was headed by Sir John Wolfenden,
and is therefore known as the Wolfenden Committee. G. GEIS, supra note I, at 42. The
Wolfenden Committee stated in its report that "[t]here must remain a realm of private moral-
ity and immorality which is, in brief and crude terms, not the law's business." H.L.A. HART,
supra, at 14-15 (quoting GREAT BRITAIN, CoMMrrrFEE ON HOMOSEXUAL OFFENSES AND
PROSTITUTION 24 (Cmnd. 247) (1957)); see also G. GEIS, supra note 1, at 42. Thus, the Brit-
ish government's mandate of "legal moralism" ended in 1966.
88. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2848 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Holmes, The Path of the
Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897)).
89. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 118-19 n.2 (1973). The Roe Court pointed out that anti-
abortion attitudes go back to ancient Greece. Id. at 131-32.
90. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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natural and familiar or novel and even shocking ought not to
conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes em-
bodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United
States." 91
By relying on history to justify constitutional analysis, Justice White
ignored precedent such as Roe where the Court clearly found that consti-
tutional analysis must go beyond looking at history. In Roe, the Court
held that despite a long history of anti-abortion statutes, such statutes
were unconstitutional, since the right to choose an abortion early in preg-
nancy is protected by the right of privacy under the due process clause of
the Constitution.92
- Another example of a Supreme Court case which held that a stat-
ute's long history is not a sufficient rationale for constitutional analysis is
Loving v. Virginia.93 There, for the first time, the Court decided whether
a statute which prevented marriage based solely on racial classifications
violated the equal protection and due process clauses of the fourteenth
amendment. 94 Penalties for miscegenation had been common in Virginia
since the colonial period, having arisen as an incident to slavery;95 and, at
the time the Court was deciding the case, sixteen states had such statutes,
and fifteen years prior, an additional fourteen states had such statutes.
96
The State of Virginia argued that when the fourteenth amendment
was enacted, the framers did not intend for state miscegenation laws to
be unconstitutional. Justice Warren, writing for the majority, responded
to the state's argument by stating, "although ... historical sources 'cast
some light' they are not sufficient to resolve the problem; '[a]t best, they
are inconclusive.' "97 Again, despite a long history of the existence of
anti-miscegenation statutes, the Court held that those statutes were un-
91. Id. at 116-17 (quoting Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting)).
92. Id. at 153. See infra text accompanying notes 145-67 for a discussion of the history of
the right of privacy. See also infra note 150 for a discussion of whether the right of privacy
emanates from the fourteenth amendment or the ninth amendment.
93. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
94. Id. at 2. In 1958, two Virginia residents, Mildred Jeter, a black woman, and Richard
Loving, a caucasian man, were married in Washington, D.C. They then returned to Virginia
to reside. A grand jury indicted the Lovings, charging them with violating Virginia's statute
which banned interracial marriages. Id. at 3. The Lovings pleaded guilty to the charge,
moved to Washington, D.C. and fied a motion in the Virginia state court to set aside their
sentence, alleging that the statutes violated the fourteenth amendment. Id. By 1964, the mo-
tion had still not been decided and the Lovings filed a class action suit in district court to
request that the court declare the Virginia antimiscegenation statutes unconstitutional. Id.
95. Id. at 6.
96. Id. at 6 n.5.
97. Id. at 9 (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 489 (1954)).
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constitutional.9" Justice White's reliance on the long history of sodomy
statutes for his conclusion in Bowers that the Georgia statute was consti-
tutional contradicted the reasoning applied in both Loving v. Virginia and
Roe v. Wade, and thus was unfounded.
2. Morality
As far back as 1887, the Supreme Court recognized that the police
power of the states includes the power to regulate morals.99 However,
the police power itself is not without limitation. In Panhandle Eastern
Pipe Line Co. v. State Highway Commission,"°° the Court stated, "[t]he
police power of a State, while not susceptible of definition with circum-
stantial precision, must be exercised within a limited ambit and is
subordinate to constitutional limitations." '° The Court has also stated
that a state's power to regulate morality alone is not absolute.
There are... limits beyond which legislation cannot rightfully
go.... If... a statute purporting to have been enacted to
protect the public health, the public morals, or the public safety
... is a palpable invasion of rights secured by the fundamental
law, it is the duty of the courts to so adjudge, and thereby give
effect to the Constitution.10 2
Therefore, contrary to Justice White's reasoning in Bowers v. Hard-
wick,"0 3 the Supreme Court's precedent indicates that the Court has been
reticent to rely upon morality in the abstract, in the absence of adverse
effects upon the individual or society as a whole, as a sufficient basis for
98. Id. at 11-12; see also Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (despite a long
history of racially based school segregation, the Court held that segregation violated the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment).
99. Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887) (Court upheld state law prohibiting manufac-
ture and sale of alcoholic beverages, but concluded that not all regulatory statutes are legiti-
mate exercises of state police powers).
100. 294 U.S. 613 (1935) (state statute which authorized the State Highway Commission to
order a privately owned pipeline company to relocate certain pipes and telephone lines at its
own expense for the alleged purpose of making travel safe, was held unconstitutional even
though regulating safety was within the state's police power).
101. Id. at 622.
102. Mugler, 123 U.S. at 661 (emphasis added). See also Note, On Privacy: Constitutional
Protection for Personal Liberty, 48 N.Y.U. L. RPv. 670 (1973), where the author argued:
Although protection of public morals is within the traditional police power of the
state, the legitimacy of this state interest may be questioned, especially when the goal
is promotion of "morality" in the abstract, without any examination of how a partic-
ular form of conduct adversely affects the individual or society as a whole.
Id. at 704.
103. 106 S. Ct. 2841. See supra text accompanying notes 45-46.
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upholding a statute alleged to violate individual rights under the
Constitution.
Eisenstadt v. Baird"° is an example of a fairly recent Supreme
Court case which held that regulating morality was an insufficient basis
for upholding a statute. That case involved a constitutional challenge of
a Massachusetts statute which criminalized the distribution of birth con-
trol devices to unmarried persons.10 5 Massachusetts argued that the stat-
ute protected morals through "'regulating the private sexual lives of
single persons.' "106 The Supreme Court agreed with the court of appeals
that morality was the state objective of the legislation because "'contra-
ceptives per se... are immoral.' "107 However, rather than holding that
the Massachusetts statute was constitutional because it was regulating
morality, the Court held that the statute violated the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. 1 8 The Court stated that since the right of
privacy'1 9 protects a married individual's right to use contraception, and
unmarried individuals have the same privacy rights as married individu-
als, the right of privacy also protects an unmarried individual's right to
use contraception. "0 Because the right of privacy was violated, morality
was not a sufficient basis for upholding the statute.
As is clear from Eisenstadt, regulating morality is not a compelling
state interest, and therefore is not a sufficient justification to uphold a
statute which otherwise violates fundamental rights under the Constitu-
tion." The statute in Eisenstadt violated the right of privacy and it was
therefore irrelevant that the statute was regulating morality." 2 The
Supreme Court in Eisenstadt did not conclude whether a state has the
power to regulate morality in the absence of a demonstrable harm." 3
However, recent Supreme Court decisions indicate the Court's reluctance
to rely on morality alone as a sufficient basis to uphold a statute alleged
104. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
105. Id. at 440-41.
106. Id. at 442 (quoting Sturgis v. Attorney Gen., 358 Mass. 37, 41, 260 N.E.2d 687, 690
(1970)).
107. Id. at 452 (quoting Commonwealth v. Baird, 429 F.2d 1398, 1401-02 (1st Cir. 1970)).
108. Id. at 454-55.
109. See infra text accompanying notes 145-67 for a discussion of the history of the right of
privacy and note 152.
110. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
111. See infra text accompanying notes 162-67 for a discussion of Roe, where the Court
concluded that a violation of a fundamental right may only be justified by a compelling state
interest.
112. See infra text accompanying notes 168-250 for a discussion of why the Bowers majority
should have held that the Georgia sodomy statute violated the constitutional right of privacy,
because the issue of morality was irrelevant in Bowers, as it was in Eisenstadt.
113. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
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to violate the Constitution. The cases indicate that there must be harm,
or a threat of harm, to the public such that the state has a legitimate
interest in regulating the behavior said to be immoral.
A Supreme Court case which supports this view is Young v. Ameri-
can Mini Theatres, Inc. 1 4 There, the Court addressed the constitutional-
ity of a Detroit ordinance which prohibited the operation of an "adult"
movie theatre, bookstore or similar establishment within 1000 feet of any
other such establishment, or within 500 feet of a residential area."' The
Court upheld the ordinance but hesitated to rely on morality alone as the
state's legitimate interest. The Court stated that the city had a legitimate
interest, other than morality, in regulating the quantity of adult movie
theatres and bookstores in a given area."1 6 The Court concluded that the
lack of such regulation would result in demonstrable harm, such as a
decrease in property values; an increase in crime such as prostitution;
and an increase in residents and businesses moving out of the city.
1 17
If the reasoning of the Bowers Court was sound, the Court in Young
could merely have stated that adult theatres were immoral and that the
ordinance was valid because the city had the authority to regulate
morals. On the contrary, the Court in Young relied on legitimate inter-
ests other than morality to uphold the city ordinance.
A similar analysis should have been applied in Bowers v. Hard-
wick. 11 Justice White should have held that morality, in the absence of a
legitimate state interest such as demonstrable harm, was not a sufficient
basis for upholding the Georgia sodomy statute. Hardwick alleged that
the Georgia statute violated his constitutional right of privacy.' 19 As
Justice Stewart stated in his dissenting opinion in Young, "[tihe guaran-
tees of the Bill of Rights were designed to protect against precisely such
majoritarian limitations on individual liberty."12 Morality is really
nothing more than popular opinion and, as Justice Stewart stated, rights
should not be subject to current popular opinion. 2'
114. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
115. Id. at 52. "Adult" theatre was defined as any theatre exhibiting material which em-
phasized "[s]pecified [s]exual [a]ctivities" or "[s]pecified [a]natomical [a]reas." Id. at 53.
116. Id. at 62-63.
117. Id. at 55.
118. 106 S. Ct. 2841.
119. Id. at 2843.
120. Young, 427 U.S. at 86 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
121. Id. (Stewart, J., dissenting). "The error here is one of assuming that something exists
called 'the method of moral philosophy' whose contours sensitive experts will agree on ....
That is not the way things are.... There simply does not exist a method of moral philoso-
phy." J.H. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIsmusT 57-58 (1980) (quoting Arnold, Professor Hart's
Theology, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1298, 1311 (1960)) (emphasis in original).
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Justice Blackmun, in his dissent in Bowers, expressed the view that
morality alone is not a sufficient basis to uphold the sodomy statute. He
stated:
This case involves no real interference with the rights of
others, for the mere knowledge that other individuals do not
adhere to one's value system cannot be a legally cognizable in-
terest . . . let alone an interest that can justify invading the
houses, hearts, and minds of citizens who choose to live their
lives differently.
122
As stated above, the Supreme Court has held that morality per se is
not a sufficient basis to proscribe contraception for unmarried individu-
als123 or for minors, 124 or to regulate adult movie theatres. 25 If Justice
White's opinion in Bowers had been consistent with precedent, he would
have held that morality was not itself a sufficiently legitimate state inter-
est to justify criminalizing consensual adult homosexual sodomy in the
privacy of an individual's home. Justice White should have examined the
facts in Bowers to determine whether a legitimate interest other than mo-
rality existed. If no other legitimate interest was found, Justice White
should have held that morality, in the abstract, was an insufficient basis
to uphold a statute which infringes upon individual rights by criminaliz-
ing consensual sodomy occurring in the privacy of the home.
3. Religion
The Constitution specifically prohibits legislation to be enacted for
the purpose of promoting religious views.' 26 The Court's reasoning in
McGowan v. Maryland 127 demonstrates the rule that a religious purpose
cannot support a statute alleged to violate the Constitution. In Mc-
Gowan, a Maryland statute prohibited the sale of merchandise on Sun-
day. This type of law, known as a "Sunday Closing Law" or a "Sunday
Blue Law,"'128 was motivated by religious forces. 129 The McGowan
122. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2856 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
123. See supra text accompanying notes 104-13.
124. See infra text accompanying notes 156-59.
125. See supra text accompanying notes 114-22.
126. See U.S. CONsT. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment
of religion .. " Id. While the first amendment specifically refers to the federal government,
over the years the Court has applied to the states through the fourteenth amendment the same
restrictions relating to religion. E.L. BARRETT, JR. & W. COHEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 518
(7th ed. 1985); see West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (unlawful for a
state law to compel children in public schools to salute the American flag and pledge
allegiance).
127. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
128. Id. at 422.
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Court stated that religious tenets cannot be the basis for a law; a state
may not use its coercive power to aid religion. 3'
A more recent case which held that the promotion of religious views
is an insufficient basis for upholding a statute alleged to violate the Con-
stitution is Stone v. Graham.3 I In Stone, the Court addressed the consti-
tutionality of a Kentucky statute, which required the posting of the Ten
Commandments 32 on the wall of every public classroom in the state.
The Court applied the following three-part test to determine if this stat-
ute was permissible under the establishment clause of the first amend-
ment:133  (1) the statute must have a secular purpose; (2) the primary
purpose must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and
(3) the statute must not foster excessive government involvement with
religion.'34 The Court held that the Kentucky statute could not pass this
test 35 because the statute had no secular legislative purpose. Therefore,
the statute was held to be unconstitutional.
1 36
Chief Justice Burger, in his concurring opinion in Bowers, relied on
religious views for support that the Georgia sodomy statute was uncon-
stitutional. 37 As stated above, this type of analysis is specifically pro-
scribed by the Constitution itself.
4. The Model Penal Code, history, morality and religion
As can be seen from the above discussion, much of the basis for the
majority's opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick'38 is inconsistent with the
Court's own precedent. History, 139 morality' 4° and religion' 4 ' are insuf-
ficient rationales for upholding a statute alleged to be unconstitutional.
Further support for this view can be found in the Model Penal
Code. 4 2 Sexual acts, such as consensual sodomy, which do not involve
129. Id at 431.
130. The statute in McGowan was upheld by the Court because the state was able to prove a
secular purpose for the legislation: to provide a uniform day of rest to improve the health and
well-being of its citizens. Id. at 444-45.
131. 449 U.S. 39 (1980).
132. The Ten Commandments is a sacred text in the Jewish and Christian religions. Id. at
41.
133. See supra note 126 for the language of the first amendment.
134. Stone, 449 U.S. at 40.
135. Idk at 42-43.
136. Id.
137. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2847. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
138. 106 S. Ct. 2841.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 87-98.
140. See supra text accompanying notes 99-125.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 126-37.
142. MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft 1955).
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violence or imposition upon children, mental incompetents or other de-
pendents are not penalized in the Code.143 Moreover, the Code clearly
provides:
"The Code does not attempt to use the power of the state
to enforce purely moral or religious standards. We deem it in-
appropriate for the government to attempt to control behavior
that has no substantial significance except as to the morality of
the actor .... Apart from the question of constitutionality
which might be raised against legislation avowedly command-
ing adherence to a particular religious or moral tenet, it must
be recognized ... that in a heterogeneous community such as
ours, different individuals and groups have widely divergent
views of the seriousness of various moral derelictions." 1"
Views regarding what behavior is moral or immoral vary greatly
from society to society, and from individual to individual. Such views
are quite subjective. They stem from religious training, as well as from
parental teachings and community attitudes. To permit a state to regu-
late behavior based solely on views of morality without requiring a show-
ing that the regulated behavior results in adverse effects upon the public
at large is in reality permitting our neighbors to dictate how we should
live our lives. The Bill of Rights was meant to protect divergent views
and divergent life-styles. A state should not have the power to prohibit
sexual intimacy between consenting adults in the privacy of the home.
The Court cannot permit an individual's life-style to be prohibited by law
merely because others in the community may find that the thought of
such a life-style offends their own view of morality. As the Model Code
states, a heterogeneous society as ours must tolerate just such differences
in life-style.
B. The Constitutional Right of Privacy Should Extend to Protect
Consensual Homosexual Sodomy
1. Historical development of the right of privacy
The Supreme Court explicitly established that a right of privacy ex-
ists in the Constitution in Griswold v. Connecticut.4 ' In that case, Gris-
wold, the Director of the Planned Parenthood League, and Buxton, a
licensed physician who was the League's Medical Director, were con-
143. Schwartz, Moral Offenses and the Model Penal Code, 63 COLtJM. L. REv. 669 (1963).
144. Id. at 674 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 207.01 comment at 207 (Tent. Draft No.
4, 1955) (emphasis added)).
145. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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victed of giving married persons information and advice regarding con-
traceptives. 14 6 By so doing, they violated a Connecticut statute which
outlawed the use of any drug, article or instrument to be used for contra-
ception.14 7 The Court held that the Connecticut statute was unconstitu-
tional because it violated the constitutional right of privacy. 14  The
Court, acknowledging that the Constitution itself does not specifically
mention a right of privacy, 14 9 stated that the right of marital privacy is
"older than the Bill of Rights."' 50 The Court defined the privacy right as
emanating from the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights-from
"penumbras" of the Bill of Rights. 5' Justice Douglas, writing the ma-
jority opinion, stated that "[the] 'right to privacy [is] no less important
than any other right... particularly reserved to the people.' o9152
It would appear that the right of privacy established in Griswold was
limited to marital privacy, since the Court rationalized its holding by
stating that the idea of police searching the sacred precincts of "marital"
bedrooms was repulsive to notions of privacy surrounding the marital
relationship. 5 3 However, the holding in Eisenstadt v. Baird 54 indicated
that the Court interpreted the right of privacy to extend to the use of
contraceptives by unmarried individuals as well. In Eisenstadt, the
Court stated, "[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted govern-
146. Id. at 480.
147. Id. (citing CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 53-32, 54-196 (1938)).
148. Id. at 485.
149. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring). "[T]he right of marital privacy
... is not mentioned explicitly in the Constitution." Id. (Goldberg, J., concurring). See also
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973).
150. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
151. Id. at 484.
152. Id. at 485 (quoting Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961)). Justice Goldberg, in his
concurring opinion in Griswold, put forth the argument that the right of privacy which pro-
tects the right of couples to use contraception emanates from the ninth amendment. Id. at 491
(Goldberg, J., concurring). Justice Goldberg stated that the right of privacy is a fundamental
right of individuals, even though it is not specifically mentioned in the Bill of Rights. He
explained that the purpose of the ninth amendment is to recognize such fundamental rights
which exist, even though not specifically enumerated in amendments I through VIII. Id. at
492-93 (Goldberg, J., concurring). See supra note 16.
In Roe, the Court stated that it believes the right of privacy emanates from an individual's
liberty interest protected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Roe, 410
U.S. at 153. See supra note 17.
In Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986), the
court relied on both the ninth amendment and the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment as the basis of the constitutional right of privacy. Id. at 1212. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 16-18.
153. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86.
154. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). See supra text accompanying notes 104-13.
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mental intrusion .... "155
Again, in Carey v. Population Services International,156 the Court
held that the right of privacy extended to individuals under sixteen years
of age to make decisions about contraception. In Carey, a New York
statute which prohibited the sale of contraceptives to those under sixteen
was held unconstitutional. 57 The Carey Court stated that a law which
prohibited minors from using contraceptives violated the constitutional
right of privacy, and that such a statute could only be upheld if the state
could prove the existence of a legitimate state interest not present in the
case of adults." 8 Since New York could not meet this burden, the Court
held that the statute was unconstitutional.
1 59
The right of privacy was further extended to protect a woman's de-
cision to have an abortion in Roe v. Wade.160 The Roe Court stated:
[The] right of privacy, whether it be founded in the Four-
teenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty and restric-
tions upon state action, as we feel it is, or, as the District Court
determined, in the Ninth Amendment's reservation of rights to
the people, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision
whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.
1 61
The right of privacy is not absolute; "62 it must be balanced against
important state interests in regulation. 163 For example, though the right
to choose to have an abortion is protected by the right of privacy, state
regulation will be permitted as the state's interest becomes more impor-
tant.164 The later the term of the pregnancy, the more compelling a
state's interest becomes in safeguarding the health of the mother, main-
taining medical standards and protecting potential life.165 The Court in
Roe stated that regulation limiting fundamental rights, such as the right
of privacy, may be justified only by a compelling state interest, and the
means must be narrowly drawn to effect the state interest.166 Regarding
abortions, the Court concluded that the compelling point is viability; the
155. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453 (emphasis in original).
156. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
157. Id. at 698-99.
158. Id. at 693.
159. Id. at 700.
160. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
161. Id. at 153. See supra note 152.
162. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 153-54.
165. Id. at 154.
166. Id. at 155.
April 1987] 1031
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 20:1013
point at which the fetus can survive outside of the mother's womb. 167 It
is only at this point in pregnancy that a state may totally proscribe
abortion.
2. The right of privacy and the protection of consensual
homosexual sodomy
Justice White incorrectly stated in Bowers v. Hardwick "8 that the
right of privacy can only be extended to those rights deemed fundamen-
tal.169 The Court's precedent contradicts this conclusion. For example,
in Stanley v. Georgia 170 the Court held that a state may not prohibit an
individual from possessing obscene material in the privacy of his or her
own home.171 The Stanley Court supported its conclusion by emphasiz-
ing the importance of an individual's right of privacy, yet the right to
possess obscene material is not itself a fundamental right.172 Writing for
the majority in Stanley, Justice Marshall stated, "fundamental is the
right to be free . . . from unwanted government intrusions into one's
privacy." 17  Thus, the Court has concluded that although the right of
privacy is fundamental, it can be extended to protect behavior which is
not deemed fundamental.
Meyer v. Nebraska 174 is another privacy case which contradicts Jus-
tice White's erroneous belief in Bowers that the right of privacy only pro-
tects fundamental rights. There, the Court held that a state law
proscribing a teacher from teaching in a language other than English
violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.1 75 In
Meyer, the right of privacy was interpreted as protecting decisions re-
garding the education of one's family. 176 However, education itself is not
a fundamental right. 177
Justice White contradicted prior Supreme Court cases by stating
167. Id. at 163-64.
168. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
169. Id. at 2843-44. See supra text accompanying notes 33-36.
170. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
171. Id. at 568.
172. Id. at 564-65. See infra text accompanying notes 215-50.
173. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 564.
174. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See also Griswold, 381 U.S. 479, where the Court stated that the
right of privacy protects a parent's decision regarding whether to educate a child in a public or
private school, as well as whether the child can study a foreign language. Id. at 482. The
Court stated that the first amendment creates such a "zone of privacy." Id. at 484.
175. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403.
176. Id. at 399-400.
177. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-35 (1973) where the
Court held: "Education... is not among the rights afforded explicit protection under our
Federal Constitution. Nor do we find any basis for saying it is [fundamental]. . . ." Id. at 35.
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that the right of privacy could not be extended to protect consensual
homosexual sodomy based on the rationale that the right to engage in
that behavior was not fundamental. Rather, he should have analyzed
why the right of privacy was extended to protect certain behavior in the
previous privacy cases, 178 and whether those reasons were present in
Bowers v. Hardwick.179 The Supreme Court's own precedent indicates
that the right of privacy should be extended to protect consensual homo-
sexual sodomy despite the fact that the right to engage in such behavior
is not fundamental.
3. The right of privacy, autonomy of decigion and consensual
homosexual sodomy
The framing of the issue was crucial to the Court's conclusion that
the right of privacy does not protect consensual homosexual sodomy.
The issue in Bowers v. Hardwick8 ° was not, as the majority stated,
whether the United States Constitution conferred a fundamental right
upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.' 8 ' Rather, the issue was
whether the constitutional right of privacy should be extended to protect
an individual's decision to engage in sexual intimacy--all individuals,
whether married or single, heterosexual or homosexual. Based on prece-
dent, the latter better states the constitutional issue in Bowers.
Contrary to Justice White's premise, I 2 the right of privacy includes
protection of an individual's right to make decisions regarding behavior
not explicitly mentioned in the language of the Constitution, as was es-
tablished in Griswold v. Connecticut, 18 3 Eisenstadt v. Baird,18 4 Roe v.
Wade,'8' and Carey v. Population Services International.'86 The right of
privacy protects an individual's "liberty" interest under the fourteenth
amendment of the Constitution.'8 7 In deciding the above cases, the
Court's role was to interpret what "liberty" meant. In Griswold, Eisen-
stadt, Roe and Carey, the Court construed "liberty" to mean an individ-
ual's right to make decisions regarding such important matters as birth
But see infra text accompanying notes 195-97 for a discussion of Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202
(1982), where the Court held that education is an important right.
178. See infra text accompanying notes 180-252.
179. See infra text accompanying notes 198-206 & 237-50.
180. 106 S. Ct. 2841.
181. Id. at 2843. See supra text accompanying note 22.
182. See supra text accompanying notes 33-36.
183. 381 U.S. 479. See supra text accompanying notes 145-53 & note 30.
184. 405 U.S. 438. See supra text accompanying notes 104-13, 154-55 & note 30.
185. 410 U.S. 113. See supra text accompanying notes 89-92, 160-67 & note 31.
186. 431 U.S. 678. See supra text accompanying notes 156-59 & note 30.
187. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
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control and abortion. In Meyer v. Nebraska 88 and Pierce v. Society of
Sisters8 9 "liberty" meant an individual's right to make decisions about
the education of one's children, despite the fact that, as Justice White
admitted in Bowers, the rights recognized in Meyer and Pierce had no
textual support in the language of the Constitution. 90
The right of privacy protects an individual's right to make decisions
regarding contraception because, as the Court stated in Carey, "[this de-
cision] concerns the most intimate of human activities and relationships
... the most private and sensitive."'' In Roe v. Wade, the Court stated
that the right of privacy protects an individual's decision regarding abor-
tions because "[tihe detriment that the State would impose upon the
pregnant woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent."' 92 As
examples of the possible detriment which could result from prohibiting a
woman from having an abortion, the Court mentioned a distressful life
and future psychological harm. 193
Decisions regarding education are also personal. Such decisions can
greatly affect an individual's entire life. While the right to education is
not a fundamental right, 194 the Court in Plyler v. Doe 95 concluded that it
is an important right, and held that a classification which deprives some
group of education cannot be considered rational unless it furthers a sub-
stantial goal of the state.'96 Further, the Court held that the state must
prove the classification is reasonably adapted to the purpose put forth by
the state.
19 7
The rights recognized in Griswold, Eisenstadt, Roe, Carey and Plyler
can easily be analogized to the facts of Bowers. An individual's decision
regarding sexual intimacy, where the behavior occurs between con-
senting adults, is certainly as private and sensitive a decision as are deci-
sions concerning abortion and contraception. No right seems more
private than the right to decide whom to be intimate with; and such a
decision is certainly as important as decisions about education. As the
Court stated in Roe, prohibiting a woman from having an abortion may
188. 262 U.S. 390. See supra text accompanying notes 174-76 & note 26.
189. 268 U.S. 510 (1925). See supra note 26.
190. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
191. Carey, 431 U.S. at 685.
192. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (emphasis added).
193. Id.
194. See supra text accompanying notes 174-77 & note 177.
195. 457 U.S. 202 (Texas statute which excluded illegal alien children from attending public
schools held unconstitutional).
196. Id. at 224.
197. Id. at 226.
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have a harmful psychological effect. 198 The same reasoning can be ap-
plied to prohibiting homosexuals from engaging in sexual intimacy. An
individual's sexuality has a significant effect on one's psychological well-
being and self-esteem. 199 Denying such intimacy to any adult can nega-
tively affect all aspects of that person's life, including one's contributions
to society. The Plyler Court stated that education is not merely "some
governmental 'benefit' indistinguishable from other forms of social wel-
fare legislation." 2" Neither is an individual's decision regarding his or
her own body and sexual intimacy.
Justice White's assertion in Bowers that it is not the Court's role to
extend the right of privacy to an area never before considered by the
Court is clearly incorrect. This is precisely what the Court did in Gris-
wold regarding contraception, and in Roe regarding abortion. Hardwick
claimed that consensual homosexual sodomy is protected by the constitu-
tional right of privacy-a claim never before considered by the Court.
As explained in the above discussion,20' it is precisely the Court's role to
interpret what "liberty" encompasses when faced with rights never
before considered by the Court and, therefore, to decide whether certain
behavior implicates the right of privacy. Thus, the Court could have
relied on the reasoning in Griswold and Roe and extended the right of
privacy to protect consensual adult sexual activity, when the behavior
occurs in the privacy of the home.
Justice White stated that "announcing rights not readily identifiable
in the Constitution's text involves much more than the imposition of the
Justices' own choice of values."2 "2 However, the only logical explanation
for the holding in Bowers v. Hardwick is that the Justices did indeed im-
pose their own choice of values in interpreting the meaning of "liberty"
under the due process clause.20 3 Clearly, the Court did not wish to ex-
tend the right of privacy since the behavior protected need not be funda-
mental. The behavior protected need only be an important interest to
implicate the right of privacy.
198. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
199. "[T]he conduct proscribed [by sodomy laws] is central to personal identities of those
singled out by [sodomy] law[s]." L. TRmIE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 943 (1978);
see id. at 944 n.17.
200. Plyler, 457 U.S. at 221.
201. See supra text accompanying notes 182-200 and infra text accompanying notes 202-03.
202. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
203. Laurence H. Tribe, professor of constitutional law at Harvard Law School, spoke at
the United States Law Week's Constitutional Law Conference of September 12-13, 1986. In
discussing Bowers v. Hardwick he stated that "it seems 'unprincipled' for the Court to 'draw
the line at combinations of body parts that the Justices find unpleasant to contemplate."'
Constitutional Law Conference, 55 U.S.L.W. 2225, 2227 (1986).
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In Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Roe and its companion
case, Doe v. Bolton,2" he stated, "[the] right of privacy... includes the
privilege of an individual to plan his own affairs, for, 'outside areas of
plainly harmful conduct, every American is left to shape his own life as
he thinks best, do what he pleases, go where he pleases.' ,,205 An individ-
ual's decision regarding whom to share sexual intimacy with and in what
manner certainly fits within this definition. Yet the Justices in Bowers
refused to extend the right of privacy to sodomy between consenting
adult homosexuals. This decision of personal choice should not be the
law's business. To be consistent with prior Supreme Court cases, Justice
White should have extended the right of privacy in Bowers v. Hardwick
to protect consensual sodomy, regarding heterosexuals and homosexuals.
The essence of constitutional democracy is that it protects minorities
who might make unorthodox choices.2" 6
As the Court stated in Roe v. Wade, the fundamental right of pri-
vacy is not absolute.2 °7 Were the decision to engage in consensual homo-
sexual sodomy protected by the fundamental right of privacy, the
Georgia statute could then only be justified by a compelling state
interest.205
The record of Bowers v. Hardwick indicated that Georgia itself did
not even conclude that prohibition of consensual sodomy was justified by
a compelling state interest. Michael Hardwick was arrested after being
caught in the act of sodomy when a policeman entered his bedroom, yet
the district attorney decided not to prosecute.209 If Hardwick had been
caught in the act of plainly harmful behavior, such as rape, murder or
robbery, it is certain that the district attorney would have decided to
prosecute.
Not only did the district attorney decide not to prosecute Hardwick,
204. 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (Georgia statute which regulated abortion procedures held to vio-
late right of privacy under due process clause).
205. Id. at 213 (Douglas, J., concurring) (quoting Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 126 (1958)).
206. Note, supra note 102, at 735.
207. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. See supra text accompanying notes 162-67.
208. Roe, 410 U.S. at 154-55, 163-64. The Court in Bowers would not go so far as to hold
that the right of privacy protects consensual sodomy in the privacy of the home, which would
require regulation in this area to be justified by a compelling state interest. At the very least,
the Court should have concluded that the right of consenting adults to engage in this behavior
in the privacy of the home is an important right. The Court should have required that regula-
tion in this area be justified by a substantial goal of the state, and that the state must prove that
the regulation is reasonably adapted to the purpose put forth by the state, as it did in Plyler,
457 U.S. at 224-26. Sie supra text accompanying notes 194-200 and infra text accompanying
notes 296-97.
209. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2842.
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but prior to Hardwick's arrest, there had been no decision regarding
prosecution for private homosexual sodomy under the Georgia statute
for several decades.21 0 Georgia courts have also held that the sodomy
statute did not apply to lesbian sexual activity,21' even though such activ-
ity falls within the definition of the statute.212 Further, Georgia did not
intend to prosecute heterosexuals under the statute.213 As Justice Black-
mun indicated in his dissent, "[tihe history of non-enforcement suggests
the moribund character today of laws criminalizing this type of private,
consensual conduct." '214 It also suggests the lack of a compelling state
interest, or surely Georgia would have been enforcing this statute over
the past several decades.
4. The right of privacy, privacy of the home and consensual
homosexual sodomy
Justice White incorrectly concluded that Stanley v. Georgia21 was
distinguishable from Bowers v. Hardwick216 as it related to privacy of the
home. He distinguished the two cases by stating that Stanley was a first
amendment case.21 7 However, he ignored the fact that Stanley stressed
the importance of protecting the sanctity and privacy of the home. Jus-
tice White should have followed the reasoning in Stanley and held that
the sodomy statute was unconstitutional with respect to consensual sod-
omy occurring in the privacy of the home. The right of privacy protects
both an individual's autonomy of decision218 and certain behavior, such
as possession of obscene material,219 based on the fact that the behavior
occurs in the privacy of the home.220  This is so because the fourth
amendment gives added importance to privacy in one's home.221 As the
210. Id. at 2848 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
211. Thompson v. Aldredge, 187 Ga. 467, 200 S.E. 799 (1939). When Aldredge was de-
cided, the statute prohibited "the carnal knowledge ... by man with man, or in the same
unnatural manner with woman." Id, 200 S.E. at 800. The court interpreted these words to
require the presence of a man for the statute to be implicated, stating that the statute did not
apply to two women. Id., 200 S.E. at 800.
212. See supra note 3.
213. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2849 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); see id. at 2848 n.2 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
214. Id. at 2848 n.2 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
215. 394 U.S. 557.
216. 106 S. Ct. 2841.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 41-43.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 180-214.
219. Stanley, 394 U.S. 557. See infra text accompanying notes 227-30.
220. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2850-51 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
221. See infra text accompanying note 223 for the language of the fourth amendment.
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Court stated in Payton v. New York:22 2
The Fourth Amendment protects the individual's privacy in a
variety of settings. In none is the zone of privacy more clearly
defined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical
dimensions of an individual's home-a zone that finds its roots
in clear and specific constitutional terms: "The right of the
people to be secure in their . .. houses . . . shall not be
violated.
223
Hardwick, relying on the reasoning of Stanley v. Georgia, 224 argued
that because the consensual behavior occurred in the privacy of his
home, the Court's result should be different.225 Yet Justice White distin-
guished Stanley, stating that the holding in that case was "firmly
grounded in the First Amendment, ' 226 not on the right of privacy. Jus-
tice White's assertion seems to be based more on personal views than on
sound interpretation of the analysis in Stanley.
In Stanley, police officers had a search warrant to search appellant's
home for evidence of bookmaking activities. 227 During the search, the
officers found three reels of eight-millimeter films. The officers screened
the films in appellant's home during the search and determined that they
were obscene.228 Appellant was arrested and found guilty of knowingly
possessing obscene matter, in violation of Georgia law.229 The Supreme
Court reversed the conviction, holding that the first and fourteenth
amendments "prohibit making mere private possession of obscene mate-
rial a crime.
230
Cases decided by the Court subsequent to Stanley indicate that the
holding in Stanley was not grounded in the first amendment.23' On the
contrary, the Court in Stanley relied on the fundamental right ofprivacy
for its holding. Stanley was specifically grounded on the rationale that
possession of obscene material in the privacy of the home deserved added
protection since state interests which apply to regulating such behavior
222. 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (fourth amendment prohibits police from making warrantless,
non-consensual entry into suspect's home to make felony arrest).
223. Id at 589 (quoting U.S. CONsT. amend. IV). See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438 (1928). "No government agent has a right... to raise the curtain and peek through
another's window." Id. at 440.
224. 394 U.S. 557.
225. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
226. Id.
227. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 558.
228. Id
229. Id.
230. Id. at 568.
231. See infra notes 234-35.
1038
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in public simply do not exist when regulating the same behavior in the
privacy of the home. The Court stated, "[w]hatever may be the justifica-
tions for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach
into the privacy of one's own home.
2 32
Previous Supreme Court cases further support the fact that Stanley
was not grounded in the first amendment. In Roth v. United States,
2 33
the Court held that "obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally
protected speech or press., 2 34 This holding was affirmed in subsequent
Supreme Court cases as well.2 35  Because obscenity is not protected
speech under the first amendment, Stanley could not have been based on
the reasoning that obscenity possessed in the home is protected by the
first amendment. The possession of obscene material in Stanley was pro-
tected because it occurred in the privacy of the home. Therefore, con-
trary to Justice White's assertion, Stanley was a privacy case, not a first
amendment case.236
Stanley v. Georgia and Bowers v. Hardwick are actually very similar
cases. Both dealt with behavior alleged to be immoral which occurred in
the privacy of the home.2 31 In Bowers, Justice White stated that the issue
232. Stanley, 394 U.S. at 565.
233. 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (federal obscenity statute did not violate freedom of speech under
the first amendment). See infra note 234.
234. Roth, 354 U.S. at 485. The Court in Roth stated that the first amendment does not
protect every utterance. Id. at 483. Speech was meant to be protected to assure the "unfet-
tered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people." Id. at 484. Since obscenity is without redeeming social importance, it is not pro-
tected speech under the first amendment. Id.
235. Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636-45 (1968) (operator of luncheonette barred
from selling magazines containing nudity to those under 17, but not to those over 17, since
state can adjust the meaning of obscenity in relation to minors); Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184, 186-87 (1964) (Supreme Court reversed conviction for exhibition of obscene film and held
that obscenity is not protected speech; however, film in question was not obscene); Smith v.
California, 361 U.S. 147, 152 (1959) (city ordinance making owner of bookstore liable for sale
of obscene books without knowledge of their contents violates freedom of the press). See supra
text accompanying notes 233-34 and infra text accompanying notes 236-50.
236. See Note, supra note 102, at 690 for support of the position that Stanley v. Georgia is a
privacy case and not a first amendment case. The author stated, "recent [Supreme Court]
decisions have erased all of [Stanley's] first amendment content and transformed it into a pure
privacy case." Id.
237. Stanley and Bowers are also similar in that both possession of obscene materials and
consensual sodomy are victimless behavior when the activity occurs in the privacy of the
home. See infra text accompanying notes 238-50. Justice White stated in Bowers that it would
be difficult to limit constitutional protection to consensual homosexual sodomy and not extend
it to adultery, incest and other sexual crimes. 106 S. Ct. at 2846. This reasoning is contrary to
the reasoning in Stanley v. Georgia, where the Court had no difficulty limiting the holding to
obscene material. The Court in Stanley stated, "[w]hat we have said in no way infringes upon
the power of the State or Federal Government to make possession of... items, such as narcot-
ics, firearms, or stolen goods, a crime." 394 U.S. at 568 n. 11. Justice White could have used
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before the Court was whether the United States Constitution conferred a
fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy.238 However,
in Stanley, the Court framed the issue differently. The Court did not
state that the issue was whether the Constitution conferred a fundamen-
tal right upon individuals to possess obscene material in the privacy of
their home. Had the issue been posed this way in Stanley, it is apparent
that the outcome would have been entirely different. Instead, the Stanley
Court framed the issue as whether the right of privacy protects an indi-
vidual's right to possess obscene material in the privacy of the home.
The issue should have been framed similarly in Bowers.
A more recent Supreme Court case, Paris Adult Theatre I v. Sla-
ton,239 further supports the view that the right of privacy was held to
apply in Stanley because the behavior in Stanley occurred in the privacy
of the home. Georgia filed a complaint demanding that appellants, two
adult theatres and their owners and managers, be enjoined from exhibit-
ing obscene films.2' The Supreme Court affirmed its holding in Roth v.
United States24 1 that obscene material is not protected speech under the
first amendment, and that states have a legitimate interest in regulating
the exhibition of obscene material in public accommodations.242 How-
ever, regarding Stanley v. Georgia, the Court stated:
If obscene material unprotected by the First Amendment
in itself carried with it a "penumbra" of constitutionally pro-
tected privacy, this Court would not have found it necessary to
decide Stanley on the narrow basis of the '!privacy of the home,"
which was hardly more than a reaffirmation that "a man's
similar reasoning in Bowers and held that the right of privacy extended to consensual homosex-
ual sodomy, but that the holding did not extend to adultery, incest or other sexual crimes.
Furthermore, it is very easy to distinguish consensual sodomy from incest, adultery or
other sexual crimes such as rape. Consensual sodomy is victimless behavior, while the others
are not. Adultery, by definition of the term, always involves a spouse's infidelity to the other
spouse. The spouses may have children. Adultery can lead to divorce, affecting the spouses
and children, if any, and may result in victims of the act becoming dependent upon the state
for support. Incest often involves children, who deserve protection from the state regarding
this behavior. Incest can also disrupt family harmony, a legitimate state interest. As Justice
Blackmun stated, "the Court makes no effort to explain why it has chosen to group private,
consensual homosexual activity with adultery and incest rather than with private, consensual
heterosexual activity by unmarried persons or ... with oral or anal sex within marriage."
Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2853-54 n.4 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
238. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2843.
239. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
240. Id. at 52.
241. 354 U.S. 476.
242. Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 69.
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home is his castle. 243
The Court in Paris Adult Theatre held that the right of privacy
cases2' did not apply since there was no "fundamental privacy right 'im-
plicit in the concept of ordered liberty' to watch obscene movies in places
of public accomodations. ' 2 45 The same reasoning was applied in Bowers
v. Hardwick, where the Court held that the right of privacy should not be
extended because there was no fundamental right to engage in consensual
homosexual sodomy.24 6 However, in Stanley the Court extended the
right of privacy to protect the possession of obscene material in the pri-
vacy of one's home. It seems doubtful, as the Bowers Court's reasoning
would indicate, that the Court believed that the Constitution bestowed a
fundamental right upon individuals to possess obscene material in one's
home. Rather, the logical conclusion is that the Stanley Court intended
that certain behavior occurring in the privacy of the home receive added
constitutional protection, more protection than the same behavior de-
serves when occurring in public. Based on the fundamental right of pri-
vacy, in addition to possession of obscene material, the right of
consenting adults to engage in sodomy also deserves such added protec-
tion when this behavior occurs in the privacy of the home.
Of course the fact that behavior occurs in the privacy of the home
does not of itself automatically render that behavior deserving of consti-
tutional protection. Not all behavior deserves such protection. Where
the state has a legitimate interest in the safety of its citizens, prohibition
of behavior in the privacy of the home is justified. Prohibitions against
crimes of violence, such as murder and robbery, must be enforced regard-
less of where the behavior occurs. Such behavior is not victimless behav-
ior, and therefore, the state's interest in protecting its citizens from harm
is equally strong whether the act takes place in public or private. The
same can be said for sexual crimes, such as rape, incest and adultery,247
as these too are not victimless acts-they result in harm. Prohibition of
the possession of dangerous drugs and weapons in the home can also be
justified. Here too, an individual under the influence of drugs may leave
his home, drive, and cause harm to others.
Victimless behavior, however, such as possession of obscene mate-
rial in the home, does deserve added protection. The state's interest in
regulating this type of behavior differs, depending on whether the act
243. Id. at 66 (emphasis added).
244. See supra notes 26-31.
245. Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 66.
246. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2844.
247. See supra note 237.
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occurs in public or in private. Possession of obscene material in the
home does not result in harm to others.
Consensual adult homosexual sodomy in the privacy of the home is
also victimless behavior. Therefore, it too deserves to be treated differ-
ently than the same behavior occurring in public. The Court in Griswold
v. Connecticut248 concluded that police may not enter the "sacred pre-
cincts" of the marital bedroom to search for contraceptives, because the
search would violate an individual's right of privacy.2 49 However, the
state does have a legitimate interest in prohibiting marital sexual activity
in public. This reasoning also applies to consensual sodomy. When the
behavior occurs in the privacy of the home, no harm occurs to members
of the public. Therefore, there is no justification to permit police to enter
an individual's bedroom to investigate sexual activity. However, the
state does have a legitimate interest in prohibiting this same behavior in
public.
Justice White's holding in Bowers was inconsistent with Stanley v.
Georgia, because he did not recognize this distinction. The Bowers ma-
jority should have held that consensual sodomy occurring in the privacy
of the home is protected behavior under the constitutional right of pri-
vacy. The Court could have further held that the same behavior occur-
ring in public is within a state's power to regulate. This holding would
have been constitutionally sound and in line with prior precedent.
Further support for this interpretation of the right of privacy is
found in a remark made by Justice Marshall. To justify the holding in
Stanley, he quoted an early Supreme Court case:
"The makers of our Constitution undertook to secure condi-
tions favorable to the pursuit of happiness. They recognized
the significance of a man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and
of his intellect .... They sought to protect Americans in their
beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations.
They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be let
alone--most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued
by civilized man."25
Justice White ignored this precedent when he wrote the majority opinion
in Bowers v. Hardwick. A better analysis was put forth by Justice Black-
mun. He stated that the issue in Bowers was "'the right to be let
248. 381 U.S. 479.
249. Id. at 485-86. See supra text accompanying notes 145-53.




alone,' "251 a much less result oriented phrasing of the issue, and con-
cluded that the Georgia sodomy statute violated the United States Con-
stitution. 2 This conclusion is much more consistent with Supreme
Court precedent.
C. The Georgia Sodomy Statute and the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment
The majority in Bowers v. Hardwick 2 3 did not address the possibil-
ity that the Georgia sodomy statute violated the equal protection clause.
Justice Blackmun, however, did mention that Hardwick may have been
successful with an equal protection challenge;2 4 but Justice Blackmun
did not discuss the issue either.255 Since the majority in Bowers refused
to extend the right of privacy to protect consensual adult homosexual
sodomy occurring in the privacy of the home, an equal protection analy-
sis is important.
The fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution states,
"[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall... deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." '256 Equal
protection prohibits the disparity in treatment between classes of individ-
uals whose situations are similar. "A reasonable classification is one
which includes all persons who are similarly situated with respect to the
purpose of the law." '257 The Court uses three standards of review when
analyzing whether a statute violates the equal protection clause.
1. Rational basis
When economic or social legislation, which discriminates against
business interests, is challenged as violating the equal protection clause,
the Court uses a standard of review known as the rational basis test. For
a statute to be upheld under this standard, (1) the classification must be
based on a legitimate state interest, and (2) the classification must ration-
ally serve the intended purpose.25 '
One example of an early case where the Court applied the modem
251. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2848 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v. United
States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
252. Id. at 2856 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
253. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
254. Id. at 2850 & n.2 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
255. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
256. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
257. Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 346
(1949).
258. L. TRIBE, supra note 199, at 995.
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rational basis test is United States v. Carolene Products Co.25 9 There, the
"Filled Milk Act" of Congress was challenged as being unconstitu-
tional. 26' The act prohibited the shipment of skimmed milk containing
any fat or oil other than milk fat in interstate commerce. The Court
deferred to Congress' purpose and upheld the act, stating:
[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to
be presumed, for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary com-
mercial transactions is not to be pronounced unconstitutional
unless in light of the facts made known or generally assumed it
is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests
upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience
of the legislators.261
The rational basis test provides a very low standard of review.
Therefore, most statutes analyzed under the rational basis standard have
been upheld.2 62 An example of a more recent Supreme Court case which
applied the rational basis test where economic legislation was challenged
is New Orleans v. Dukes.263 There, a city ordinance prohibited vendors
from selling food from pushcarts in an area called the Vieux Carre (also
known asthe French Quarter) unless they had been operating within that
area for eight years or more prior to January 1, 1972.2 4 The Court up-
held the ordinance, stating that the city's purpose was to "'preserve the
appearance and custom valued by the Quarter's residents and attractive
to tourists.' "265 Therefore, the ordinance was rationally related to the
purpose.
266
In-Dukes, the Court held that, "[w]hen... economic regulation is
259. 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
260. Id. at 145-46.
261. Id. at 152 (footnote omitted).
262. See infra note 266 for examples of cases decided under the rational basis standard.
263. 427 U.S. 297 (1976).
264. Id. at 298.
265. Id. at 304 (quoting Dukes v. New Orleans, 501 F.2d 706, 709 (5th Cir. 1974)).
266. Id. at 305. For other cases challenging economic or social legislation where the Court
used the rational basis test and upheld the regulation, see United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v.
Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980) (section of Railroad Retirement Act, which, as restructured by
Congress in 1974, divided employees into several groups for retirement benefits, did not violate
equal protection); Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955) (subjecting opticians to
regulation while exempting all sellers of ready to wear glasses did not violate equal protection);
Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) (New York City regulation forbid-
ding advertising on vehicles unless the advertisement was for product being sold by the owner
of the vehicle did not violate equal protection). The only case in the last half century to
invalidate wholly economic legislation was Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957) (Illinois stat-
ute which imposed licensing requirement on firms issuing money orders other than American
Express money orders violated equal protection). Morey was overruled in Dukes, 427 U.S.
297, 306 (1974).
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challenged.., as violating the Equal Protection Clause, this Court con-
sistently defers to legislative determinations as to the desirability of par-
ticular statutory discriminations."267 The Court is deferential regarding
state economic legislation which discriminates against business interests
based on the belief in judicial restraint.268 The Court has stated that it
does not want to be a "superlegislature" judging the wisdom of the state's
legislative policy determinations.269 Only recently has the Court applied
the rational basis test and struck down legislation as violating the equal
protection clause.270
2. Strict scrutiny
The strict scrutiny standard requires that the classification be justi-
fied by a compelling state interest, which is " 'necessary... to the accom-
plishment' of its legitimate purpose.' "271 The Court first addressed the
need for a higher standard of review in a footnote in United States v.
Carolene Products Co. 272 In Carolene, Justice Stone discussed the possi-
ble necessity of a "stricter" standard to evaluate classifications which are
within a specific prohibition of the Constitution.273 He stated:
There may be a narrower scope for operation ... when
legislation [is]...
...directed at particular religious ...or racial minorities,
whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorites may be
a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail the opera-
tion of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly
more searching judicial inquiry.
2 74
The Court adopted the suggestion in the Carolene footnote and ap-
plies strict scrutiny when a legislative classification burdens a suspect
267. Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303.
268. L. TRIBE, supra note 199, at 995.
269. Dukes, 427 U.S. at 303.
270. See infra text accompanying notes 315-25 for a discussion of City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985), where the Supreme Court invalidated a statute
employing the rational basis standard. See also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S.
869 (1985) (Alabama tax statute favoring domestic business violated equal protection under
rational basis standard, where state interest was not legitimate).
271. Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 432-33 (1984) (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379
U.S. 184, 196 (1964)) (Court decision determining child custody on basis of race violates equal
protection).
272. 304 U.S. 144.
273. Id. at 152 n.4.
274. Id. (citation omitted).
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class-defined as a discrete, insular group "saddled with such disabilites,
or subjected to such a history of purposeful unequal treatment, or rele-
gated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command ex-
traordinary protection from the majoritarian political process."'2 s
Suspect classes include classifications based on race 276 and alienage.
277
Strict scrutiny is necessary because, unlike economic legislation
where individuals can pressure the legislators to correct abuse, the polit-
ical process may not be responsive when legislation exists which disad-
vantages a suspect class. A suspect class, by its definition, is a minority,
and the political process is based on majority rule.
The strict scrutiny standard is also applied when a classification de-
prives, infringes or interferes with a fundamental right or liberty.278 For
example, in Shapiro v. Thompson 279 the Court held that a statute which
denied welfare assistance to residents who had not resided within the
jurisdiction for at least one year prior to their application for assistance
was in violation of the equal protection clause.280 The Court concluded
that the statute interfered with the fundamental right to travel. 281 The
Court stated that "any classification which serves to penalize the exercise
of [a fundamental] right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a com-
pelling governmental interest, is unconstitutional .... 22
Contrary to classifications analyzed under rational basis, those
anlayzed under strict scrutiny are nearly always struck down.283 In fact,
in only one case, Korematsu v. United States,284 was a classification based
275. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (Texas school
district system which relied on local property taxes, thereby favoring wealthy districts, did not
violate equal protection since education is not a fundamental right and the system did not
burden a suspect class). See supra note 177.
276. See Palmore, 466 U.S. 429 (1984); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (statute
prohibiting marriage based on racial classifications held unconstitutional); Brown v. Board of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (Court held that segregation in schools is unconstitutional; separate
is not equal regarding education). See supra text accompanying notes 93-98 for a discussion of
Loving.
277. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (statute excluding resident aliens from
receipt of welfare benefits violated equal protection). Cf. Bemal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216
(1984) (aliens are not a suspect class in all contexts).
278. San Antonio, 411 U.S. I (citing Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972); Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969)); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)).
279. 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
280. Id. at 627.
281. Id. at 630-31.
282. Id. at 634 (emphasis in original).
283. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 319 (1976) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). "If a statute is subject to strict scrutiny, the statute always, or nearly always, is
struck down." Id.
284. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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on race upheld by the Court as constitutional. In Korematsu, a military
order excluded people of Japanese ancestry from certain west coast areas,
whether or not they were United States citizens."' The Court applied
strict scrutiny since the order classified based on race, and upheld the
order as constitutional,2" 6 stating that the compelling interest was na-
tional security. However, this was a very unusual case, and its holding
very limited, because it occurred while the United States was at war and
had recently been attacked by Japan.
3. Intermediate scrutiny
As stated above, classifications analyzed under rational basis were
almost always upheld,287 and those analyzed under strict scrutiny were
consistently struck down.288 Realizing this, the Court acknowledged
that a standard of review somewhere between these extremes was neces-
sary.2" 9 Though the Court did not itself articulate that it was using an
intermediate standard,29 the Court did apply this standard when focus-
ing on the character of the classification, the importance of the govern-
ment benefit being deprived, and the state interest. 91 To withstand
constitutional analysis under this intermediate standard, the classifica-
tion "must serve important governmental objectives and must be sub-
stantially related to achievement of those objectives."2 92
The Court has applied this standard to classifications based on gen-
der293 and illegitimacy. 294 The Court has also applied this standard
285. Id. at 215-16.
286. Id. at 219.
287. See cases cited supra at note 266.
288. See supra text accompanying notes 283-86.
289. L. TRIBE, supra note 199, at 1082. In the famous Bakke case, Justice Brennan stated,
"the fact that this case does not fit neatly into our prior analytic framework for race cases does
not mean that it should be analyzed by applying the very loose rational-basis standard ...."
University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 358 (1978) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (foot-
note omitted). In Bakke, the Court held that a special admissions program in a medical school
which favored disadvantaged minorities violated equal protection.
290. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 318 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "[T]he rigid two-tiered model
[strict scrutiny and rational basis] still holds sway as the Court's articulated description of the
equal protection test." Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
291. Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
292. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). See infra note 293 for cases where the Court
applied the intermediate scrutiny standard.
293. See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982) (state statute which
excluded males from enrolling in state-supported professional nursing school held unconstitu-
tional); Michael M. v. Superior Ct., 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (California's statutory rape law
which made men alone criminally liable held valid-justification offered by the state to prevent
illegitimate teenage pregnancy was entitled to great deference); Craig, 429 U.S. 190 (statute
which prohibited the sale of alcoholic beverages to males under the age of 21 and females
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when analyzing a classification which burdens an important, though not
fundamental, right, such as education.295 For example, in Plyler v.
Doe29 6 the Court held unconstitutional a Texas statute which excluded
illegal alien children from attending public school. Since the statute de-
prived those children of education, an important right, and the exclusion
of illegal alien children from public schools was not justified by a sub-
stantial state interest, the statute violated equal protection.297
Unlike rational basis and strict scrutiny, where the Court's outcome
is often predictable, statutes subject to intermediate scrutiny have been
both upheld and invalidated.298
4. Analysis of the Georgia statute under the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment
In Bowers v. Hardwick 299 an equal protection analysis is necessary
because the Georgia statute, as applied, treats male homosexuals differ-
ently than heterosexuals and differently than lesbians, 3m even though the
statute itself is gender-neutral.0 1 One question to address is which equal
protection standard of review is proper: rational basis, strict scrutiny, or
intermediate scrutiny.
It has been argued that homosexuals are a suspect class, deserving
strict scrutinya 2 In fact, homosexuals satisfy the criteria of suspect
class stated in Matthews v. Lucas: "a characteristic determined by causes
not within the control of the.., individual, and [which] bears no relation
under the age of 18 held invalid); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (Florida statute grant-
ing widows, but not widowers, a $500 property tax exemption upheld); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S.
71 (1971) (Idaho statute choosing males over females to administer intestate estate violated
equal protection).
294. Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982) (Texas statute requiring that paternity suit be
brought before illegitimate child is one year old violates equal protection); see also Lalli v.
Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978) (New York statute which required that illegitimate children, but not
legitimate children, who would inherit from their fathers by intestate succession provide proof
of paternity violated equal protection). Although "classifications based on illegitimacy are not
subject to 'strict scrutiny,' they nevertheless are invalid under the Fourteenth Amendment if
they are not substantially related to permissible state interests." Id. at 265.
295. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982). See supra text accompanying notes 194-97 and
infra text accompanying notes 296-97.
296. 457 U.S. 202.
297. Id. at 230.
298. See cases cited supra at note 293.
299. 106 S. Ct. 2841.
300. See supra text accompanying notes 211-13.
301. See supra note 3.
302. See Note, The Constitutional Status of Sexual Orientation: Homosexuality as a Suspect
Classification, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1285 (1985).
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to the individual's ability to participate in and contribute to society. 30 3
However, rather than extending the suspect classification category to in-
clude those other than race and alienage, the Court has "apparently lost
interest in recognizing further... 'suspect' classes. ' '3 4 For example, in
Frontiero v. Richardson,"5 the Court stated that women were a suspect
class.306 On the other hand, in Craig v. Boren3 °7 the Court retreated
from this position and used intermediate scrutiny regarding gender clas-
sifications. 308 The Court has retreated in the same manner in cases in-
volving alienage classifications. In early cases, it concluded that aliens
were a suspect class, 309 but later held that in certain contexts aliens were
not a suspect class.3
It could be argued that classifications based on homosexuality, like
those based on gender, deserve intermediate scrutiny, since homosexuals,
like women, have been subject to a long history of purposeful discrimina-
tion. However, as with suspect classes, the Court in recent cases has
refused to extend the quasi-suspect status to new groups.311 Since the
Court has not been willing to extend the suspect or quasi-suspect status
to new groups, 312 it seems unlikely that homosexuals would be an excep-
tion. However, the Georgia statute as applied violates the equal protec-
tion clause even under the rational basis standard.
Under the rational basis standard, for a statute to be upheld it must
be based on a legitimate state interest and the means must be rationally
related to the purpose of the statute. 3  The Court itself has stated, "the
pertinent inquiry is whether the classification . . . advances legitimate
303. 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976) (social security statutes regarding survival benefits with dif-
ferent burden for illegitimates regarding dependency requirements held not to violate equal
protection). See L. TRIBE, supra note 199, at 944 n.17; see also J.H. ELY, supra note 121, at
163. "It is a combination of the factors of prejudice and hideability that renders classifications
that disadvantage homosexuals suspicious." Id.
304. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 318-19 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
305. 411 U.S. 677 (1973) (federal statute declaring that spouses of male members of the
armed services, but not spouses of female members, were dependents regarding military bene-
fits, violated equal protection).
306. Id. at 682.
307. 429 U.S. 190.
308. Id. at 197-99. See supra note 293.
309. Graham, 403 U.S. 365. See supra note 277.
310. Bernal, 467 U.S. 216. See supra note 277.
311. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (intermediate status not extended to mentally retarded);
Schweiker v. Wilson, 450 U.S. 221 (1981) (suspect or quasi-suspect status not extended to
mentally ill); Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (statute requiring mandatory retirement of state police
officers at age 50 did not violate equal protection under rational basis, and age classification did
not require intermediate scrutiny).
312. See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
313. See supra text accompanying note 258.
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legislative goals in a rational fashion... although this rational-basis stan-
dard is 'not a toothless one.' ,314
Recent cases indicate that the Court is moving away from total def-
erence to the legislative determinations generally applied under the ra-
tional basis test.315 City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center316 is an
example of a recent Supreme Court case which struck down legislation
under the rational basis standard. In Cleburne, the City of Cleburne de-
nied a special use permit for the operation of a group home, which was
going to be used to house thirteen retarded men and women.317 Under
the city zoning regulations, a special use permit was required for "hospi-
tals for the insane and feeble-minded. ' 318 Cleburne Living Center filed
suit against the city, alleging that the zoning ordinance violated its equal
protection rights on its face and as applied, because the statute discrimi-
nated against the mentally retarded.31 9 The district court held that the
ordinance was constitutional since mental retardation was neither a sus-
pect nor a quasi-suspect classification. 320 The Fifth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals reversed, holding that mental retardation was a quasi-suspect
class.321 The Supreme Court granted certiorari,322 and vacated the hold-
ing of the Fifth Circuit that the mentally retarded were a quasi-suspect
class.323 However, employing the rational basis standard, the Court
stated, "[b]ecause in our view the record does not reveal any rational
basis for believing that the... home would pose any special threat to the
city's legitimate interests, we affirm the judgment below insofar as it
314. Schweiker, 450 U.S. at 234 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976)). See
supra notes 303 and 311.
315. See Murgia, 427 U.S. at 321 (Marshall, J., dissenting): "[Tihe Court has rejected,
albeit, sub silentio, its most deferential statements of the rationality standard in assessing the
validity under the Equal Protection Clause of much noneconomic legislation."
316. 105 S. Ct. 3249. See generally Note, A Changing Equal Protection Standard? The
Supreme Court's Application of a Heightened Rational Basis Test in City of Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, 20 LoY. L.A.L. Rnv. 921 (1987).
317. Id. at 3252.
318. Id.
319. Id. at 3253.
320. Id.
321. Cleburne Living Center v. City of Cleburne, 726 F.2d 191, 197 (5th Cir. 1984), aff'd
on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 3249 (1985).
322. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 427 (1984).
323. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3257. The Court stated:
[1]f the large and amorphous class of the mentally retarded were deemed quasi-sus-
pect for the reasons given by the Court of Appeals, it would be difficult to find a
principled way to distinguish a variety of other groups who have perhaps immutable
disabilities setting them off from others, who cannot themselves mandate the desired
legislative responses, and who can claim some degree of prejudice from at least part




holds the ordinance invalid as applied in this case."'3 24 The statute did
not survive rational basis, because the interests put forth by the city were
not rationally related to the statute as applied in that case.325
Although the rational basis standard, as it was applied in Cleburne,
is an exception to the general rational basis test, it seems that the Court
should apply the same rational basis standard to Bowers v. Hardwick. As
discussed above, the Court is very deferential regarding economic legisla-
tive classifications which burden business interests.326 However, it seems
that the Court was less deferential in Cleburne because the classification
burdened a particular minority-the mentally retarded, and the interest
affected-housing, was more important than purely economic interests.
As Justice Marshall stated in Massachusetts Board of Retirement v.
Murgia,3 "7 "time and time again, met with cases touching upon the
prized rights and burdened classes of our society, the Court has acted
only after a reasonably probing look at the legislative goals and means,
and at the significance of the personal rights and interests invaded." '328
The Georgia sodomy statute, as applied, burdens homosexuals.
Homosexuals are a minority group with a long history of purposeful dis-
crimination. The statute also infringes upon an important right: the
right of an adult to decide whom to be sexually intimate with and in what
manner, when the activity occurs in the privacy of the home. Therefore,
since the Georgia statute is not merely burdening economic business in-
terests, the Court's heightened rational basis standard which was used
in Cleburne, should be applied when analyzing the constitutionality of
the sodomy statute in Bowers. Under the standard used in Cleburne,
Georgia's sodomy statute violates equal protection and is, therefore,
unconstitutional.
The Georgia legislature intended for the sodomy statute to apply to
all persons, not solely to male homosexuals.329 The statute itself does not
324. Id. at 3259.
325. Id. at 3259-60. The city put forth several interests to justify the ordinance: (1) to
avoid negative attitudes of those living near the boarding house and to avoid fear of the men-
tally retarded by the elderly residents; (2) to avoid harassment of the mentally retarded by
students from a nearby junior high school; (3) to avoid the possibility of a flood; (4) to avoid
conflict over legal issues which may arise from actions taken by the mentally retarded; and (5)
to avoid overcrowding in the home. Id.
326. See supra text accompanying notes 258-70 & note 266.
327. 427 U.S. 307.
328. Id. at 320 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "[T]he Court has rejected its most deferential
statements of the rationality standard in assessing the validity under the Equal Protection
Clause of much noneconomic legislation." Id. at 321 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
329. See supra text accompanying notes 211-13.
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classify based on gender.330 The statute, as it was worded in 1933,331 was
meant to apply to heterosexuals as well as homosexuals, but the Georgia
courts held that the statute did not apply to heterosexual cunnilingus
332
or to lesbian sexual activity.3 33 The Georgia legislature then amended
the statute in 1968331 to proscribe "any sexual act involving the sex or-
gans of one person and the mouth or anus of another.' ' 3  Since the stat-
ute itself does not mention gender, it includes heterosexual activity as
well as lesbian activity. Yet in Bowers v. Hardwick, the State of Georgia
stated that it did not have any interest in prosecuting heterosexuals.336
Therefore, Georgia is applying the statute in a discriminatory manner,
contrary to the original intent of the Georgia legislature. To pass the
rational basis test, a legitimate state interest must exist to justify the une-
qual application of the statute,33 7 and the means must be rationally re-
lated to the purpose of the statute.338
Georgia argued that homosexual sodomy "may have serious adverse
consequences for 'the general public health and welfare,' such as spread-
ing communicable diseases or fostering other criminal activity.
'339
These are not valid arguments. As far as "other criminal activity," is
concerned, "[t]here is no evidence to support, and much to refute, the
theory that those who deviate from conventional sexual morality are in
other ways hostile to society. '' 3 ° Regarding the spreading of communi-
cable diseases, where diseases are transmitted through sexual contact, the
330. See supra note 3.
331. The statute proscribed "[tjhe carnal knowledge by man with man or in the same un-
natural manner with woman." Thompson v. Aldredge, 187 Ga. 467, 467, 200 S.E. 799, 800
(1939) (quoting GA. CODE ANN. § 26-5901 (1933)).
332. Riley v. Garrett, 219 Ga. 345, 133 S.E.2d 367 (1963); see Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2849 n. I
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
333. Aldredge, 187 Ga. 467, 200 S.E. 799. See Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2849 n.1 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
334. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2849 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated
that "Georgia passed the act specific statute currently in force 'perhaps in response to the
restrictive court decisions such as Riley."' Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Note, The
Crimes Against Nature, J. PUB. L. 159, 167 n.47 (1967)).
335. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2(a) (1984).
336. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2849 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting transcript of oral
argument).
337. In Doe v. Commonwealth, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975), aff'd, 425 U.S. 901
(1976), the state of Virginia failed to introduce any evidence whatever regarding interests fur-
thered by the Virginia sodomy law. See L. TRIBE, supra note 199, at 942 (emphasis added).
338. If the statute were worded so that it specifically criminalized sodomy only by homo-
sexual men, the same analysis would apply. However, instead of being a violation of equal
protection as applied, it would be a violation on its face.
339. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2853 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Brief for Petitioner).
340. H.L.A. HART, supra note 87, at 51 (emphasis added).
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risk of such transmission is the same whether the sexual activity occurs
between heterosexuals or homosexuals. 341 Therefore, applying the stat-
ute to only male homosexuals is under-inclusive342 and violates that
group's equal protection rights.
Further support for the absence of a legitimate state interest can be
found in the lack of any prosecution under the statute. As stated
above,343 there had been no prosecution under the Georgia sodomy stat-
ute for several decades. Even in Hardwick's case, the attorney general
decided not to prosecute. 3 "
As demonstrated in previous Supreme Court cases, "mere negative
attitudes, or fear, unsubstantiated by factors which are properly cogniza-
ble... are not permissible bases for [disparate treatment] .... 'Private
biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or
indirectly, give them effect.' ,341 Therefore, selective application of the
Georgia sodomy statute cannot be justified by negative attitudes about
homosexuality.
There is no proof that consensual adult homosexual sodomy occur-
ring in the privacy of the home adversely affects any individuals. In fact,
the Model Penal Code346 has stated just the opposite view: "[N]o harm
to the secular interests of the community is involved in atypical sex prac-
341. It was reported in The Washington Post that the initial vote in Bowers v. Hardwick was
five to four in favor of Hardwick, but that Justice Powell subsequently changed his mind.
Robinson, Sodomy and the Supreme Court, COMMENTARY, Oct. 1986, at 57, 60. In the St.
Louis Post-Dispatch, a columnist speculated that the Georgia sodomy statute was upheld due
to its perceived prevention of the spread of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).
Id.
AIDS is the terminal stage of a viral infection and the majority of AIDS victims are
homosexual men. Id. at 57-58. However, AIDS is spread by sexual contact; AIDS is not a
homosexual disease. Contracting AIDS "has nothing to do with whether you are black, ho-
mosexual or Haitian." McAuliffe, AIDS: At the Dawn of Fear, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD RE-
PORT, Jan. 12, 1987, at 62. "The disease of them.. . presumed just a few years ago to be
confined to homosexuals, Haitians and hemophiliacs is now a plague of the mainstream, find-
ing fertile growth among heterosexuals." Id. at 60 (quoting Dr. June Osborn, Dean of the
School of Public Health at the University of Michigan) (emphasis in original). A full discus-
sion of AIDS is beyond the scope of this Note.
342. The term "under-inclusive" when used in equal protection analysis means that the
classification does not include all who are similarly situated regarding the purpose of the stat-
ute. Therefore, the group burdened by the classification is less than the total which should be
included within the group to achieve the purpose of the classification. L. TRIBE, supra note
199, at 997.
343. See supra text accompanying notes 209-14.
344. See supra text accompanying notes 8 & 209.
345. Cleburne, 105 S. Ct. at 3259 (quoting Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984)).
346. MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft 1955).
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tice in private between consenting adult partners. 347
A legitimate state interest has not been stated and does not exist to
justify the discriminatory application of the Georgia sodomy statute.
Therefore, the statute, as applied, violates equal protection even under
the rational basis standard.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Bowers v. Hardwick,348 the Court was faced with the issue of
whether Georgia's sodomy statute was constitutional. The Court, rely-
ing on history, morality and religion, held that the statute was constitu-
tional. As has been shown, the long history of a statute's existence,
morality alone, and religion, are insufficient bases for constitutional
analysis.
The Court also held that the constitutional right of privacy did not
extend to consensual homosexual sodomy occurring in the privacy of the
home. Though the statute was gender-neutral, the Court did not address
whether consensual heterosexual sodomy implicated the right of privacy.
The Court's reasoning contradicted the majority of privacy cases previ-
ously decided by the Court.
Although the Court did not address equal protection, the Georgia
sodomy statute, as applied, violates the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment. Georgia is applying the gender-neutral sodomy
statute to only male homosexuals; however, no legitimate state interest
exists to justify this discriminatory application.
Justice White, writing for the majority, stated that "announcing
rights not readily identifiable in the Constitution's text involves much
more than the imposition of the Justices' own choice of values. '3 49 It
seems that the holding in Bowers was based on the Justices' own prejudi-
cial view against homosexuality. The reasoning relied upon by the Court
to justify the holding that Georgia's sodomy statute was constitutional is
contrary to the Court's prior notions of liberty and privacy.
Randi Maurer
347. H.L.A. HART, supra note 87, at 15 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE (Tent. Draft
1955)).
348. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
349. Id. at 2844.
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